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Police and surveillance in Paris: are the French Police becoming knowledge workers and 
risk managers? 
Anaïk Purenne
1
  
Version auteur, révisée avant publication, du chapitre paru dans Vande Walle Gudrun, Van 
den Herrewegen Evelien, Zurawski Nils (Eds.), Crime, Security and Surveillance. Effects for 
the Surveillant and the Surveilled, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2012, p 163-
176. 
 
Introduction 
Data collection and analysis are not a recent phenomenon. However, major changes have 
occurred in recent decades. Surveillance now appears as a general tool in modern institutions 
and as a symptom of a ‘softening’ of social control, especially in the field of security and 
crime control (Marx, 1988; Lyon, 2007). This idea of ‘softening’ describes the extension of 
new means or ‘tools of government’ (Hood, 1983), which are less focused on direct and 
coercive treatment than in the past. These softer forms of social control do not appear as less 
threatening than the use of force: on the contrary, the academic discourse is clearly a critical 
one.
2
 This trend is well-documented in the context of North America, for example, in the 
police institution; examining another local context, the French police, will be the main 
objective of this chapter.
3
  
As in other European countries, surveillance is now an important issue in the French political 
arena. For instance, many official speeches stress the need to modernise the police through 
surveillance technologies-based innovations. During the past few years, successive home 
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ministers have indicated their continued determination to carry on with the development of 
databases (national and genetic fingerprints files, etc.), to develop a ‘”mass” scientific police 
for purposes other than investigations of serious crimes’
4
 (a workshop initiated since 1995), to 
extend ‘crime analysis tools to the fight against petty crime’,
5
 or to set up new computerised 
databases like ‘gang related files that allow investigators to identify and arrest gang members 
who cause trouble’.
6
 This emphasis on new methods and uses of information coincides with a 
moment of institutional crisis. Indeed, a new concern about the State and the legitimate use of 
violence has emerged in social discourse in the past few years. Stating an example in the 
current French context: the use of force (stops and search, identity checks, arrests, admissions 
in police custody, etc.) provokes more intense protest than in the past, especially in the 
poorest suburbs (Wuilleumier & Purenne, 2011). 
The question is whether these initiatives are rhetorical or reality, even if Jérôme Ferret and 
Vincent Spenlehauer underline, following Michel Foucault’s warning, that ‘surveillance 
projects ... are destined either to remain projects or to take shape only partially’ (Ferret & 
Spenlehauer, 2008, p. 11). Keeping in mind this idea, our concern is to examine to what 
extent these political initiatives around surveillance are beginning to take shape within the 
French police and to what extent they contribute to a significant change in police practices. 
This analysis is based on an empirical study relating to two different services belonging to the 
Paris police department: an urban police service, on the one hand, and a transport police 
service patrolling the Paris metro and rail network on the other. The local experiments I 
studied are limited and not fully representative of the national French police force. Indeed, the 
aim was to focus on services dedicated to experiment with new methods (like prototypes), 
rather than representative examples of the French context. In that perspective, the Paris police 
department appears as a relevant case, since it is historically conceived as the first ‘laboratory 
of modernity’ (Berlière, 1996) within the French ‘Police Nationale’.
7
 The two cases I studied 
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illustrate this trend and have experimented with important reforms in the last decade. More 
particularly, both examples exemplify the rise of surveillance (i.e. data collection and 
analysis) and knowledge work dimension.
8
  
In the first part of the chapter, I examine the paradigm developed by Ericson and Haggerty 
(1997), who defend the idea that the contemporary police have become ‘knowledge workers’, 
devoted to the anticipation of various kinds of risks. Taking into account the development of 
surveillance and the transition to a ‘risk-thinking society’, this paradigm provides a useful 
theoretical framework and concepts to examine the potential transformation of police work. 
The second part of the chapter analyses the example of the Paris urban police service, where 
uses of information appear to be quite convergent with the framework proposed by Ericson 
and Haggerty. Indeed, police officers are pushed by their hierarchy to collect information 
about risky places or activities and to communicate with vulnerable social groups in order to 
minimise crime opportunities. However, this growing concern for crime prevention and 
knowledge working does not exclude the use of more traditional means and logics of crime 
control. The case study of the transit police service also confirms this idea. It suggests that 
surveillance technologies can be used to target or ‘rationalise’ the use of force. By the term 
‘rationalise’, I mean that the places identified as high-risk are placed under intensive police 
scrutiny to create a situation in which coercion becomes highly visible. Nevertheless, as Peter 
Manning (2008) has argued in his analysis on the effects of crime mapping, this dominant use 
of surveillance technologies sustains a very conservative approach to policing. Consequently, 
these French experiments document the idea of a limited diversification of the police toolkit, 
rather than the hypothesis of a radical transformation of police work. 
The police as risk managers: a new conceptualisation of police work 
For many scholars of surveillance, the spread of risk-thinking (Beck, 1992) and risk 
management appears as ‘an increasingly important spur to surveillance’ (Lyon, 2003, p. 8). 
According to David Murakami Wood and William Webster, ‘the new technologies are placed 
in the service of this agenda: collecting and sorting data on people, things and events in order 
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to produce categories of risk .... As the “risk-surveillance society” has become the “ideal-
type” state of the twenty-first century, so its aims - anticipated and premanaged risk, safety, 
control, security – are increasingly permeating policy and practice at every level’ (Wood & 
Webster, 2009, p. 3-4).  
For Ericson and Haggerty, this trend is especially salient in the field of security and crime 
control and the police play a pivotal role in this ‘risk society’. Following Foucault (1977) and 
Beck’s (1992) ideas, Ericson and Haggerty propose a new conceptualisation of police work: 
the police must be viewed as knowledge workers and ‘centers of calculation’ (Latour, 1987) 
of various kinds of risks, rather than as law enforcement agencies (Ericson & Haggerty, 
1997). From various examples within the Canadian context, Ericson and Haggerty argue that 
information gathering and risk communication have become time-consuming activities and 
even central tasks for police officers. For instance, in the largest police departments, dedicated 
units are in charge of gathering information and processing knowledge on risk.  
This growing concern for risk management and crime prevention is not only an internal affair 
but an inter-institutional concern. In fact, the information gathered by the police is used by a 
wide range of public and private organisations. So the police have become ‘information 
brokers to institutions [which] operate based on a knowledge of risk’. The knowledge 
supplied by the police is used by these institutions to implement risk minimisation and 
actuarial strategies. The insurance industry offers a good illustration of this idea. Insurance 
companies depend on the first-hand information gathered by police officers in cases of traffic 
accidents or burglaries. These data are used by the companies to develop their own protocol 
of risk-profiling, which eventually leads to an increase in insurance rates for high-risk drivers 
or to encourage victimised shopkeepers to install specific equipment to reduce crime 
opportunities.  
Moreover, the police also use this knowledge in order to prevent crime and to ‘provide [local 
groups] with expert advice and ... help them manage their risks’ (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). 
Ericson and Haggerty analyse the community policing initiatives that are routinely developed 
by many police departments as a mere discourse of rationalisation of this risk management 
approach. These initiatives currently involve what David Garland calls responsibilisation 
strategies. For Garland, this strategy ‘involves the central government seeking to act upon 
crime not in a direct fashion through state agencies ... but instead by acting indirectly, seeking 
to activate action on the part of non-state agencies and organizations. ... Its primary concern is 
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to devolve responsibility for crime prevention on to agencies, organisations and individuals 
which are quite outside the state and to persuade them to act appropriately’ (Garland, 1996, p. 
452). In this perspective, the core activity of the police is not direct control over the 
neighbourhood,
9
 but a more distant and insidious form of control through information 
campaigns targeting local communities and ‘at risk’ groups. 
The Paris urban police service as information brokers 
The Paris Police Prefecture has a unique position within the French ‘Police Nationale’ and it 
has the status of experimental laboratory (cf. supra footnote 6). For instance, at the end of the 
1990s, the left-wing government of Lionel Jospin and the Home Minister Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement decided to develop a kind of community policing (‘police de proximité’) model 
within the French national police. The urban police service, which is one of the largest 
services of the Paris Police Prefecture, has been designated to experiment with new practices 
before generalising the ‘police de proximité’ model (Roché, 2005). This urban police service 
is composed of twenty police stations, one per ‘arrondissement’ or district.
10
 Since the 
implementation of the ‘police de proximité’ reform in 1999, the urban police service ensures 
the security in city streets. To fulfil this mission, the police stations are requested to develop a 
special partnership with the elected officials and the population. Through this networking, 
each police station centralises information about the problems faced by different social groups 
and help them minimise crime opportunities (Purenne, Aust & Ferret, 2006). In that 
perspective, the police could be viewed as knowledge brokers to local organisations or actors 
occupations. But my interviews and observations also show that police officers are still 
involved in direct control of public spaces and law enforcement activities 
The police station: a node of risk communications 
The empirical study conducted in three Paris police stations confirms the idea that a ‘core 
technology of police work is information’.
11
 In this framework, the police officers and their 
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hierarchy develop relations with local actors and organisations. The purpose of this 
networking is to produce knowledge of risk that could be useful to anticipate problems.
12
  
This elaborate networking is based on a kind of ‘division of relational labour’. The chiefs of 
the police station have a central position in these relational activities. They make sure that 
they develop personal relations with all actors concerned with tackling crime: elected 
officials, community associations, social services, school authorities, local shopkeepers, etc. 
Within this network, they generally have ‘a special collaboration’
13
 with the district mayor. 
Indeed, the mayor is himself at the centre of a broad network of communications and is 
generally well informed of local problems. Since the reform of 1999, a parallel circuit of 
information collection has also been set up in each police station. Community police officers 
are in charge of developing close relations with local residents, caretakers and occupations 
exposed to crime such as pharmacists, café owners or grocers. During their routine patrol, 
their duty is to collect information and complaints about the problems faced by vulnerable 
shopkeepers and inhabitants, and to report them to their hierarchy. In addition, specialised 
units created in 1999, the ‘prevention and communication units’, organise meetings with 
senior residents or school authorities to detect specific problems like thefts targeting elderly 
people or the rise of misbehaviour at school. They also inspect places or occupations 
identified as risky (like jewellers, banks, etc.) to detect at-risk situations. Another unit placed 
under the command of a police lieutenant, the ‘bureau of operations’, is the specific 
interlocutor both for external institutions (such as roadway authorities and public transport 
network) and for other police services within the Paris Police Prefecture.  
Throughout this elaborate communications circuit between the police and external institutions 
and individuals, the chief of each police station generally has, on a day-to-day basis, an in-
depth and comprehensive knowledge of local problems and security needs of the various 
groups.  
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A set of tactics including responsibilisation 
These data, information, complaints and security needs are used to identify populations or 
places that are exposed to various kinds of troubles (theft, racketeering, noise pollution, etc.), 
and to diagnose the sources of the problem in order to provide appropriate solutions. This 
work of diagnosis is based on a qualitative analysis of the information collected by police 
officers, and/or on statistical analysis distributed by analysts at the headquarters, for instance, 
when a specific problem goes beyond the boundaries of a single district. The police lieutenant 
placed at the head of the bureau of operations has a central role in this process of risk analysis 
and management. This lieutenant is generally a senior officer with relational skills and has the 
complete trust of the chief of the police station.  
Once a problem and its causes have been identified, different kinds of solutions can be 
implemented, depending on the nature of these problems. At first, special operations of law 
enforcement can be set up at a ‘hot spot’. Police officers at the local police station or from 
other units are requested to target this zone and to issue summonses to minimise the trouble. 
Once the operation is completed, an evaluation is communicated to local actors to show that 
the police are fully in charge. According to the management staff I interviewed, this ‘hot spot 
policing’ strategy is a major part of their units’ workload, besides responding to emergency 
calls.
14
 
‘In analysing local crime in great detail, each police station deploys their officers in operations targeted 
at very specific objectives (crimes and offences committed in specific places and at specific times: street 
violence, drug trafficking, peddling, etc). They receive the support of specialised units with powers that 
extend across the entire capital or to specific parts of it, such as the Security Squad and Anti-Crime 
Units.’ 
http://www.prefecturedepolice.interieur.gouv.fr/Pied-de-page/English/Police-missions/The-urban-
neighbourhood-police-department 
Another kind of tactics that echoes the responsibilisation strategy identified by D. Garland is 
to associate external local institutions and to give them expert advice to minimise troubles. 
For instance, a lieutenant I interviewed explained that the solution for the problem of road 
accidents ‘can be to intensify police presence, to issue summonses, but also to alert the Paris 
City Department of Transportation and propose a reengineering of the road or new road 
signs’.
15
 Diverse ‘techniques of persuasion’ are also implemented ‘to anticipate the problems’ 
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or ‘resolve the problem at its source’.
16
 For instance, information campaigns are organised to 
sensitise the most vulnerable groups and to persuade them to change their habits in order to 
limit criminal opportunities. This role is especially designated to the police officers of the 
prevention and communication units. 
‘Informing, alerting and raising awareness: the [urban police service] engage in wide-ranging crime-
prevention work to protect all section of society, particularly the most vulnerable. The prevention and 
communication units of the arrondissement police stations organise talks for elderly people (advising 
them how to take care on the streets, guarding against bogus callers, etc), children and teenagers (the 
dangers of drugs, racketeering and all forms of violence in the school, road safety), tourists and people in 
occupations where they may be exposed to crime.’  
http://www.prefecturedepolice.interieur.gouv.fr/Pied-de-page/English/Police-
missions/The-urban-neighbourhood-police-department 
 
These campaigns take different forms. Brochures can be distributed that list habits to avoid, 
for instance, for children exposed to racketeering: ‘take little cash with you’, ‘do not stay 
isolated on the street’; or for tourists: ‘do not leave your methods of payment in your coat on a 
chair (at restaurant or in cafés for instance), a pickpocket could sit behind you and steal your 
belongings’.
17
 Conferences and debates are also organised by police officers to meet specific 
groups. In addition, these officers set up training sessions for representatives of vulnerable 
occupations who in turn can then develop their own awareness campaigns. At the same time, 
home surveillance is organised by police stations during summer holidays to prevent 
burglaries. The variety of these activities is shown in this table. 
 
Vulnerable groups Category of risk Kind of responses 
Youths 
 
Use of drug 
Racketeering 
Misbehaviour and 
violence at school 
Road safety 
School programmes : conferences, debates, visits  
‘Concerts citoyens’ initiative 
Seniors Road safety 
Burglary 
Theft 
Violent theft 
Conferences, debates, visits  
Meetings with external institutions (social services, etc.) 
 
Shopkeepers (banks, jewellers, 
pharmacists…) 
Burglary 
Theft 
 
Meetings with partners 
Advices and information about security equipment 
(alarms, CCTV, etc.)  
‘Tranquillité vacances’ initiative (routine patrols and 
shop surveillance) 
Property owners Burglary 
Noise pollution 
Damage 
Meetings with partners 
Inspection and expert advices (security equipment, etc.) 
 
Residents Burglary ‘Tranquillité Vacances’ initiative (home surveillance) 
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Although they may seem discreet, these activities of persuasion represent a substantial amount 
of time, both in the urban police service and in other units of the Paris Police Prefecture. For 
instance, an internal document indicates that from 2008 to 2009, nearly 3,000 conferences 
were set up in schools and that police officers met 75,000 children.
18
  
This strategy of responsibilisation has become a routine and institutionalised one in Paris, 
even after the ‘police de proximité’ model lost legitimacy through political rhetoric and was 
supplanted by more aggressive discourses (Monjardet, 2006). Indeed, this diversification of 
roles and strategies reinforces the power and the influence of the police. The more the police 
take into account the wide-ranging demands of citizens, the more pivotal they become and the 
more legitimacy they gain. Moreover, the responsibilisation strategy is not irreconcilable or 
diametrically opposed to more traditional tactics, like saturation patrols or hot-spot policing. 
On the contrary, such a diversification is viewed by police managers as an extension of the 
police toolkit. These practices aiming to convince potential victims to change their habits 
coexist with traditional tactics based on means of coercion against offenders (summonses, 
arrests, admissions in police custody, etc.). These observations suggest a kind of ‘policy mix’ 
rather than the radical change suggested by Ericson and Haggerty. 
The Paris transport police service: a highly visible use of force in high-risk territories 
As mentioned above, a new political rhetoric that is dominated by the idea of engaging ‘war 
against crime’ has developed in France over the last decade. This new discourse takes place in 
a context of continuous rise of crime rates, which was a major issue during the electoral 
campaign in 2002 (Monjardet, 2006). After the presidential elections and the arrival of a 
right-wing government, the new home minister at that time, Nicolas Sarkozy, initiated several 
workshops (‘new management’ of security, increasing staff and material means, technology-
based surveillance innovations, etc.) to sustain the impression that police can win this ‘war 
against crime’.  
The Paris transport police service is one of these measures. Paris city was confronted with 
high rate of crime and delinquency in the public transport system. In order to address this 
problem, which has negative repercussions for the image of the capital city, the home minister 
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announced the creation, within the Paris Police Prefecture, of a service devoted to ensuring 
the security of public transport users throughout Paris and its suburbs (approximately 7 
million passengers each day).
19
 New methods and new uses of information technology 
(CCTV, crime mapping, databases, etc.) were promoted to ‘eradicate not only the feeling of 
insecurity, but insecurity itself’.
20
  
A reorganisation based on a new division of labour and the use of surveillance technologies 
The Paris transport police, whose creation has been popularised through the media, are not an 
entirely novel entity.
21
 Indeed, two services in charge of security in the public transport 
system previously existed. The first one, created in 1976, had jurisdiction in the Paris metro; 
the second one was devoted to regional and local trains (RER) outside Paris. The first service 
was based largely on the experience and discretion of police officers. Due to hierarchical 
pressure to issue summonses and make arrests, these police officers often developed practices 
like ‘contrôles au faciès’ (racial profiling) (Paperman, 1992). In 2002, these two services were 
merged in a unique service with regional authority, and new surveillance devices such as 
CCTV, databases, and crime mapping, were developed to allow a ‘rational’ targeting of the 
use of force.  
The staff is divided into two main divisions: a patrol division organised into 160 police 
squads, and a criminal investigation division organised into four specialised units. Within the 
patrol division, a team of computer experts and intelligence analysts has been set up in order 
to produce knowledge about crime in public transportation. One of the main tools of these 
experts is the creation of a computer database containing detailed and exhaustive information 
about each crime committed in public transport: date, time, location, type of crime or injury, 
kind of modus operandi, distinguishing features of the offender, etc. Coupled with crime 
mapping tools and with an extensive video surveillance system of 9,500 CCTV covering the 
whole regional rail network, it permits the team of analysts to develop risk-profiling activities 
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and to identify trends and patterns of crime across time and space.
22
 This knowledge of risk is 
controlled and appropriated by the top management. It gives them the possibility to reduce the 
autonomy of police officers and practices of racial profiling that were widespread in the 
former transport police. 
A paradoxical crime-attack strategy: a highly visible use of force 
In this new division of labour, the discretion of police officers is strongly diminished. Officers 
of the 160 squads of the patrol division are simply requested to ‘be in the right place at the 
right time’. At first, routine police patrols are deployed in crime hotspots identified through 
risk-profiling activities. By their permanent presence on the favourite territories of offenders 
committing thefts, violent thefts, and assaults (the most frequent crimes in Paris transport 
area), they are intended to deter crime before it is committed. As the official presentation of 
the Paris Transport Police explains, ‘In response to the random and widespread nature of the 
crime on public transport, a division has been set up. ... Every day it deploys ... patrols at 600 
railway stations and on 700 ... trains, focusing its efforts on the routes and the times of day 
that pose the greatest problems.’
23
  
At the same time, large-scale operations, bringing together several hundred police officers 
from several departments, are organised each week at a given place and time to create a 
situation in which coercion, or at least the threat of coercion, becomes highly visible in order 
to discourage potential offenders. One of the specific characters of the Paris context is that the 
Paris police commissioner (or ‘préfet de police’) has authority over a wide range of external 
services, including local units of the National Police and of the National Gendarmerie in the 
whole Île-de-France region, but also over private security forces hired by the railway 
companies. This huge pool of force is clearly a crucial resource in developing this kind of 
crime control strategy based on means of coercion against offenders, even if these means are 
only partially used within the transport police. 
Indeed, a remarkable feature of this crime-attack strategy is that this massive deployment of 
force remains essentially ostentatious, in the sense that identity checks are promoted by the 
hierarchy to the detriment of arrests and admissions to police custody. To limit the autonomy 
of the patrol squads, the top and middle management allege that pressure is applied on them 
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 Préfecture de police de Paris, Le Service Régional de Police des Transports, op.cit. 
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and impose a maximum number of arrests. Indeed, arrests take time and generate a lot of 
paperwork. As a commanding officer of the patrol division explains, ‘There is no quota in this 
service. The main purpose is to show ourselves. The guys are required to be in the right place 
at the right time.’ This rule does not imply that police officers remain inactive when 
confronted by offences: they are encouraged to give a simple warning or to check the identity 
of the offenders, rather than to criminalise the incident and prosecute them. This management 
and the use of surveillance devices contribute to a ‘rational’ targeting of the use of force that 
sustains ‘the myth that the sovereign state is capable of providing security’ (Garland, 1996, p. 
448). 
‘Following the creation of the Regional Transport Police Service in September 2002, crime on the 
region’s rail networks has dropped by nearly half, with a particularly significant drop in pick pocketing 
being recorded.’ 
http://www.prefecturedepolice.interieur.gouv.fr/Pied-de-page/English/Police-missions/The-urban-
neighbourhood-police-department 
 
Presented as a successful device, this local experience has been rapidly institutionalised and 
extended through to the creation of a ‘Service National de Police des Transports’
24
 in June 
2006. Directed by the former chief of the Paris transport police who was promoted at the head 
of this new National Service of Transport Police, it is based on similar methods and strategies 
to provide security on the national rail network. Furthermore, in April 2010, after a series of 
assaults against ticket inspectors in the Paris suburbs, a new national programme for security 
in public transportation (‘Plan national de sécurisation des transports’) was elaborated by the 
Home Ministry. Rather than taking the hypothesis of inadequate strategies seriously,
25
 this 
programme considers police means to be insufficient. In this perspective, the home minister 
announced his will to amplify the aggressive model of crime control experimented with in 
Paris since 2002. 10,000 additional CCTV will be installed in the near future and a budget of 
30 million Euros will be allocated by the State to develop these technologies in order to detect 
                                                          
24
 National Service of Transport Police. 
25
 As Manning outlines, such saturation patrols that have existed for decades remain dominant police tactics and 
their efficiency is never questioned even when sophisticated technological means, such as crime mapping, are 
introduced (Manning, 2008). That is why he concludes that the use of information technology does not lead to 
significant changes in police practices. 
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potential offenders and to anticipate crime. A new task force will also be created to produce 
knowledge of risk and to ‘engage in the war against insecurity in public transportation’.
26
 
Conclusion: old wine in new bottles or a gradual change? 
In The Culture of Control, David Garland underlines ‘a new and urgent emphasis upon ... the 
containment of danger, the identification and management of any kind of risk’ (Garland, 
2001, p. 12). In a society structured to manage risk, the police are viewed as knowledge 
workers placed at the core of a risk communication network. The core technology of such 
police work is not the use of force, but the gathering and processing of information. The 
experiences observed in Paris within a department of the ‘Police Nationale’ confirm the fact 
that a greater knowledge work dimension is being introduced within police work, either to 
target the use of force, as in the case of the Paris transport police, or to diversify the spectrum 
of police tools, as in the example of the Paris urban service. These initiatives are often 
accompanied by a political rhetoric of ‘modernisation’ of police activities through the 
promotion of new methods and uses of information.  
However, the statement of newness of these so-called modern police practices has significant 
limitations. As our French examples suggest (and this observation echoes Manning’s 
observations in the American context), these surveillance-based innovations and the 
knowledge work dimension may accompany the use of coercive force and legitimate 
conservative crime control perspectives (see also Purenne & Wuilleumier, 2011). In this 
French case, the conservative trend illustrated by the rhetoric of ‘war against crime’ is now 
firmly established both in public discourse and in concrete measures. Since 2002, a large set 
of law and order policies has been adopted and certain scholars even raise the idea of a 
‘frenzy of security measures’ (Mucchielli, 2008).  
In this light, the risk-management discourse may be conceived as a rationalised expression of 
professional stereotypes and traditional ways of thinking (Bouagga, 2010). As David Lyon 
outlines, ‘High-tech policing may involve wireless web-based data searches, but it has not 
moved beyond notion such as city “hotspots” to pinpoint areas requiring special police 
attention, where “annoying behavior” may occur, or where it is important that certain social 
elements, above all the poor, be cleaned away for tourism’ (Lyon, 2003, p. 21). From that 
                                                          
26
 Brice Hortefeux, Home Minister, 14 April 2010, 
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_la_une/toute_l_actualite/securite-interieure/plan-securisation-transports 
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perspective, ‘The argument claiming that the police are now an information-based 
organization, focusing on managing risk and enhancing security, is both premature and 
flawed’ (Manning, 2008, p. 262). Indeed, police commissioners are generally more interested 
in the symbolic ‘aura’ of technology, rather than in the potential of surveillance as a means to 
explore new ways of acting on crime (see also Dupont, 2004). 
Nevertheless, even if the shift in police practices is only partial, the far-reaching effects of 
surveillance-based innovations should not be underestimated. Indeed, even if political leaders 
or police commissioners want to make an impact in the short term and use surveillance 
devices to promote a professional image of the police, new ways of thinking can still 
permeate police forces gradually and can become dominant in the long term. That is why it is 
important to study the possible changes at stake, both for police institutions and for the 
‘surveilled’,
27
 from a more longitudinal or long-term perspective.  
                                                          
27
 Many scholars confirm that the consequences of such actuarial logics are not neutral for the surveilled. In 
particular, the culture of risk management generally results in police over-attention to groups identified as high 
profile and may have damaging effects in terms of negative stigmatisation of the surveilled (Harcourt, 2007). 
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